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Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
ALFRED ROGER MOORE, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE 





BRIEF IN ANSWER TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Petition for Rehearing poses the identical ques-
tions considered by this court on the appeal. It is not urged 
that the court has misconstrued the arguments or has over-
looked any of the facts. The same authorities are cited and 
the same arguments rehashed. In short, nothing is raised 
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by the petition which was not considered on the appeal and 
in the opinion of this court. 
We set forth herein a concise answer to the renewed 
arguments. A more complete answer may be found in the 
briefs heretofore filed and in the opinion of the court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
TH ... L\.T THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN-
STRUCTED THAT THEY WERE NOT TO 
TAI{E INTO CONSIDERATION ANY EVI-
DENCE REGARDING A RUPTURED DISC. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IN-
STRUCTION NO. 12 SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IN-
STRUCTION NO. 13 SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
POINT IV. 
T'HE CONCURRING JUDGES DID NOT ERR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE VERDICT WAS EX-
CESSIVE INDICATING BIAS AND PREJU-
DICE ON THE PART OF THE JURORS. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




THIS COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN-
STRUCTED THAT THEY WERE NOT TO 
TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION ANY EVI-
DENCE REGARDING A RUPTURED DISC. 
In their brief petitioner's counsel point out that plain-
tiff's injury is "nerve root irritation." It is urged that 
the court has confused this proposition. From the opinion, 
however, it is clear that the court had a complete under-
standing of the facts. We quote Justice McDonough: 
"On the basis of this evidence, plus the history 
of pain as given him [the doctor] by respondent, 
he concluded that there was a nerve irritation, and 
that it was possible that the accident initiated the 
condition and, when queried about his opinion as to 
what was causing the nerve irritation, he testified: 
" 'Again it is a possibility. It is my opin-
ion that this is possibly due to pressure on the 
nerve in the lower spine due to irritation from 
a disc.' 
* * * * 
"It is, of course, possible that the jury in assess-
ing the award considered merely the doctor's posi-
tive assertion of the existence of a 'nerve irritation,' 
but his testimony as to the permanency of disability 
was linked to the possibility of a disc injury and a 
discussion of disc injuries, including diagrams, oc-
cupied a considerable portion of evidence offered 
through him, thus impressing the jury with the 
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seriousness of such a condition. Under these cir-
cumstances, if the proof of such an injury falls 
short of that required under our law, then an in-
struction to that effect should have been given the 
jury." 
It is manifest from the record that the whole point of 
plaintiff's case was to prove a permanent spinal injury 
resulting from the accident. His difficulty was that the 
doctor he had employed for trial would not testify that 
such an injury was probable or likely (R. 65). Instead, he 
said "It is just a possible condition (R. 65) ." Since there 
was no other evidence in the case indicating a spinal in-
jury this court was required to decide whether the doctor's 
testimony was sufficient to support a finding of a disc 
lDJUry. 
The majority opinion holding that the doctor's testi-
mony was not sufficient evidence follows the decisions of 
all other courts which have decided the question including 
this court in the case of Chief Consolidated Mining Com-
pany v. Salisbury, 6 Utah 66, 210 Pac. 929. Mr. Justice 
Crockett acknowledges that the rule laid down by the 
majority of this court is correct, but reaches a different 
conclusion on the issue because he feels the lay testimony 
indicated a disc injury. Petitioner, in his brief on rehear-
ing, argues the case from a still different standpoint. He 
contends that under the Utah Fuel case the evidence was 
sufficient to show nerve irritation and since "No cause [of 
the nerve irritation] other than a ruptured disc was sug-
gested by anyone (P. 5)" it must follow that there was 
sufficient proof of a disc injury. In other words, the failure 
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of the defendant to prove that there was no disc injury is, 
in itself, proof of the existence of such an injury. 
This same specious argument was made on the appeal 
and is fully dealt with at page 7 of our reply brief. Suffice 
it to say here that if plaintiff claimed the nerve irritation 
was caused by a disc injury he had the burden of proving 
it and the only evidence on that point was Dr. Clegg's testi-
mony that such a condition was medically "possible." Coun-
sel fail to grasp that it is at this point of their case that the 
Salisbury decision comes into play. With this in mind, it 
is obvious that whether or not the jury could find the ex-
istence of "nerve irritation" under the Utah Fuel case does 
not have any bearing upon the real problem in the lawsuit, 
i. e. whether the doctor's testimony was sufficient under 
the Salisbury case to show a disc injury. 
Petitioner's counsel cite Story Parchment Co. v. Pat-
terson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U. S. 55, for the proposi-
tion that the rule preventing recovery where damages are 
uncertain does not apply if the fact of damage is certain. 
This rule obviously has no application to the instant case 
because the question here was whether there was sufficient 
proof of a substantial element of damage which the jury 
was allowed to consider in assessing damages. The very 
fact of the alleged disc injury was in issue. The Story case 
may have had some application if it had appeared that the 
jury considered only those injuries which were proved and 
if the appeal questioned only the certainty of the monetary 
amount of damages allowed for such injuries. 
The statement that "apparently the majority opinion 
holds that causal relation is not a jury question (P. 7)" 
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demonstrates a complete failure on counsel's part to under-
stand the opinion for this court did not decide the case on 
the question of causal relation-it held that the evidence 
was not sufficient to show the existence of the alleged in-
jury. If the evidence had been sufficient to show a disc 
injury then the court would have be·en required to decide 
whether the evidence warranted a finding that such injury 
was caused by the accident. 
The Moore decision represents a recognition by the 
court that there must be some limit to the weight which may 
be given to the speculation and conjecture of doctors. The 
opinion affirms sound law in this age where given symp-
toms may indicate to a medical expert innumerable medic-
ally possible conditions some of which, as in the instant 
case, cannot even be said to be probable conditions. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IN-
STRUCTION NO. 12 SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT IN-
STRUCTION NO. 13 SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY. 
The opinion of this court instructs the trial court not 
to give instructions 12 and 13 on a retrial. Petitioner's 
counsel suggest that this is a "peculiar thing * * * 
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[for] the opinion * * * nowhere holds the * * * 
instructions to be prejudicial or reversible error (P. 11) ." 
There is nothing peculiar or even unusual about the opinion 
because there was no occasion to determine whether error 
in giving these instructions was prejudicial as the judg-
ment was set aside on other grounds. However, the court 
was compelled by its rules to determine whether these in-
structions were proper. Rule 76 (a) URCP provides: 
"If a new trial is granted, the court shall pass 
upon and determine a.ll questions of law involved in 
the case presented upon the appeal and necessary to 
the final determination of the case." 
See Z occolillo v. 0. S. L. R. Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 Pac. 
201. 
The court correctly decided that the instructions were 
improper and should not have been given. The purpose of 
instructions is to enlighten the jurors as to the issues and 
to assist them in their determination of the facts-not to 
inject into the case extraneous matter which can only con-
fuse and perhaps distort deliberations on the operative facts. 
The Moore decision simply affirms the rule stated in Parker 
v. Bamberger, 100 Utah 361, 116 P. 2d 425, 430 to the effect 
that: 
"* * * it is error for the trial court to give 
an instruction, though such an instruction correctly 
states the law, on a matter extraneous the issues 
and evidence of the case." 
Petitioner's counsel are no doubt aware of the fact 
that similar instructions have been held not only improper 
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but prejudicial. In a recent case, for example, it was held 
that an instruction given by a trial court to the effe-ct that 
a verdict for personal injuries is not subject to federal 
income tax constituted prejudicial error. Wagner V. Illinois 
Central Railroad Company, 129 N. E. 2d 771 (Ill. 1955). 
See also lrfaus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad 
Company-, 128 N. E. 2d 166 (Ohio 1955). Certainly no dis-
tinction can be made bet,veen this income tax instruction 
and those given in the instant case. We think the instruc-
tions were not only erroneous but prejudicial. 
Counsel's main argument for the instructions is that 
the railroad secured other instructions which in their opin-
ion were similar and consequently equally improper. The 
simple answer is that the propriety of the other instructions 
referred to was not before the court on this appeal. Even 
if such instructions had been questioned on this appeal they 
do not fall in the same category as instructions Nos. 12 and 
13. The latter instructions not only are wholly unrelated 
to the evidence and the issues, but are calculated to divert 
the minds of the jurors therefrom to the prejudice of the 
defendant. On the other hand, the instruction that railroad 
companies are not insurers of the safety of their employees 
has a direct bearing on negligence which is always an issue 
in F. E. L. A. cases. The sentence containing the word "in-
surers" is only a part of the instruction defining the duty 
of the railroad (R. 292). Likewise the instruction on sym-
pathy does not inject a foreign issue. This instruction was 
given by the court on its own motion as a part of the general 
instructions (R. 296) and applies to all parties to the suit. 
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POINT IV. 
T'HE CONCURRING JUDGES DID NOT ERR 
IN HOLDING THAT THE VERDICT WAS EX-
CESSIVE INDICATING BIAS AND PREJU-
DICE ON THE PART OF THE JURORS. 
The evidence relating to this point was painstakingly 
briefed on the appeal and the minority opinion demonstrates 
a thorough understanding of the facts. 
Petitioner's counsel gloss over the facts relating to 
Moore's activities after the injury. The record discloses 
that counsel's statements are for the most part misleading, 
incomplete and incorrect. (See R. 115, 46 re elk hunting; 
R. 291-220 re dancing; R. 209, 210, 112 re leave of absence.) 
A fair and impartial consideration of all of the evi-
dence concerning l\tloore's alleged injury and of his activi-
ties following the accident compel the conclusion reached 
by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the issues raised by this petition have 
already been carefully considered and have been correctly 
decided by this court. It follows that the petition should 
be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN c·oTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY, 
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR., 
Counsel for Appellant. 
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